“I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.”

Karl R. Popper

The Open Society and its Enemies

 

                                                                                      “Wisdom and goodness to the vile seem vile.”

Shakespeare

King Lear

    

All traditions of thought reveal distinct paths, twists, nuances, and ramifications that make it difficult to group them together as if they were a monolithic and absolutely homogeneous entity. The same is true of most authors, in proportion to the number of works produced and the length of time they have spent on their respective intellectual endeavors. In the case of what has come to be called modernism and postmodernism, this occurs perhaps more forcefully due to the various interpretations that have been attributed to them over time and even the various connotations that have simultaneously been applied to and applied to these labels. They are not univocal concepts, especially when it comes to “postmodernity” since the very nature of this idea implies the notion of the specific meaninglessness of things, which, of course, includes postmodernism itself. Generic designations are usually used as a way of simplifying the task, thereby avoiding complex individualizations; however, this does not always achieve justice.

I

 

 

    Modernity is the heir of a long tradition whose beginning can be traced back to classical Greece, where the haphazard process of evolution begins. logos, That is, asking why things are the way they are and proposing the modification of the modifiable rather than resigning ourselves to accepting them without questioning. Louis Rougier states that this is precisely what the myth of Prometheus consists of, which expresses the attempt to break with superstition and that “Greece’s contribution to Western civilization consisted in giving meaning to the word ‘reason’. In contrast to the East, which silently submitted to the mandates of the gods and the dictates of the kings, the Greeks sought to understand the world in which they lived […] New words appear that have no equivalent in the ancient Eastern languages: theory, logical demonstration and syllogism. This records a quantum leap for the human spirit achieved in Greece. The Greeks discovered the power of deductive thought, the rules of demonstration. The Eleatic School Greeks early distinguished the field of opinion of the one of True.”[1] But modernism proper is Renaissance-style, although more or less marked traits can be traced in some scholastic philosophers (sorry for that).²) and especially in the late scholasticism of the School of Salamanca³. In any case, the so-called modernism burst into bloom during the French Revolution.[2] before plunging into the counterrevolution of the Jacobins, terror and the rationalism of the Enlightenment.

Postmodernism, for its part, apparently emerged from the student uprising of May 1968 in Paris.[3] and finds its roots in authors such as Nietzsche and Heidegger⁶.

²                                Unfortunately, they are not few the followers of the Escolasticism who confuse modernity with Illuminism (as we will see later, the very widespread confusion between critical rationalism and constructivist rationalism); see Gabriel J. Zanotti, “Modernity and the Enlightenment”, Libertas, No. 11, October 1989, year VI.

³                                See Vid. Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson The School of Salamanca, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952.

                                                                                                 

Foucault (who is known to belong to the sub-classification of pragmatism, deconstructionism and poststructuralism respectively, although, in the latter case, in addition to the Lacanian influence, the connection is more than with Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and with Roland Barthes (1915-1980), it is closer to Claude Levi-Strauss’ structuralism, who, among other things, emphasizes his relativism, for example, in Structural anthropology, Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958 and even before the term “postmodern” was coined, anthropologists Melville Herskovits, Bronislaw Malinowski and Ruth Benedict (followed by authors such as Clifford and Tyler). Less well known, although very prolific, is Don Lavoie who claims to be a disciple of the hermeneutician Hans-Georg Gadamer. For an analysis of Rorty-Derrida-Foucault (in addition to Jean-Francis Lyotard and diving into sources such as Williard Quine, Donald Davison and the first Wittgenstein), see Christopher Norris, Against Relativism. Philosophy of Science, Deconstruction and Critical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997, an work in which the refutations are illustrated primarily through examples taken from the natural sciences. For a broader context, see also this last author's work., The Truth About Postmodernism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993 and Reclaiming Truth: Contribution to a Critique of Cultural Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. For studies of postmodernist visions linked to the social sciences, see, for example, Fredric Jameson Postmodernism or the cultural logic of advanced capitalism, Buenos Aires: Paidós [1984] 1995, Mike Featherstone Consumer Culture and Postmodernism, Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores, [1991] 2000 and Nicolás Casullo, Ricardo Forester and Alejandro Kaufman Trajectories of modernity. Currents of the past and intellectual traditions from the Enlightenment to postmodernism, Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1999. It should be borne in mind that, while many authors describe postmodernism as a healthy reaction to capitalism, others, on the other hand, consider it to be an unhealthy consequence of modern capitalism; in this sense, among others, besides Jameson op. cit. see Daniel Bell “Beyond Modernism, Beyond Self”, Sociological Journeys, London: Heinemann, 1980 and, to some extent, J. Baudrillard The Mirror of Production, St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975. According to postmodern authors, the famous debate between Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault has served to clarify the scope and the pros and cons of this tradition, reproduced in Theory, Culture & Society “The Fate of Modernity”, 1985, No. 3, which was completed with responses and critiques in Nos. 2 and 3 of 1988 under the title of “Postmodernism”. Anyway, as we have pointed out, the expression Postmodern It is ambiguous, slippery, and at times contradictory depending on the author who addresses the subject; for example, it does not help to specify the concept, the definition that Lyotard himself tries to define: “Postmodernism simply indicates a

 

 

 

     Postmodernists accuse their opponents of being “logocentrist”, reject reason, are epistemological relativists (which includes the variants of cultural and ethical relativism) and adopt a hermeneutics of singular characteristics, also relativist, which therefore does not allow for interpretations more or less adjusted to the text. George B. Madison explains that “one of the things that postmodernism emphasizes is that, in fact, there is no such thing as meaning” own It’s nothing […] that I. A. Richards very aptly titled as ‘The superstition of self-meaning’. Postmodernism maintains that all meaning is dialectical.”⁷ This, as mentioned, ultimately applies to the “meaning” of postmodernism itself. That is why Denis Donoghue points out that practically every student of our culture is required to, among other things, express their position regarding postmodernism, even if that actually means anything we want it to mean.⁸ Featherstone tells us that “there is as yet no general agreement on the meaning of the term postmodern.” However, curiously, on the same page, he concludes that “Postmodernism is of interest to a wide range of artistic practices and disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities because it prompts us to pay attention to changes occurring in contemporary culture.”.⁹

                                                                                                 

mood or, rather, a mental state”, “Rules and Paradoxes or Svelte Appendix”, Cultural Critique, 1986-87, No. 5, p. 209.

⁷ “Postmodern Philosophy?”, Critical Review, 2, spring/summer, 1988, p. 167. ⁸ “The Promiscuous Cool of Posmodernism”, The New York Times Book Review, June 22, 1986.

⁹ Culture of… op. cit., p. 36. We emphasize again that the various interpretations of postmodernism are accompanied by a difference in perspective: in some cases, postmodernity is referred to as a regenerative reaction of modernity, and in others, as a necessary derivative of it; but the rejection of the roots of modernity is always present.

In one of the books by Isaiah Berlin that collects a collection of texts[4] It refers to some aspects that are inherent to those of postmodernism, although this terminology did not exist at that time. Berlin refers to a turning point in history that occurs “towards the end of the 18th century, mainly in Germany; and although it is generally known under the name of ‘romanticism’, its meaning and importance have not been fully appreciated even today.”[5]. He claims that this is “an inversion of the idea of truth as correspondence, or at any rate as a fixed relationship with the world.” Rerum natura, That comes from God and is eternal and constitutes the basis of natural law.”[6]. In Fichte it is seen that “what matters is his thesis that values are constructed, not discovered”[7]. In short, it shows “how the essence of man is now identified, not with reason, which must be one in all men, but with the source of action, will; the wills of men can come into conflict in a way in which the products of reason—true descriptive statements—cannot logically enter.”[8], It is, in short, “the rupture with the objective classical world”¹⁵. Berlin says that for Romanticism only the group exists and not the individual; this “in its socialized form carries the idea of autarky—the closed, centrally planned society of Fichte and Friedrich List and many socialists—which isolates them from external interference in order to be independent and express their own inner personality without interference from other men.”[9]. Berlin insists that this way of seeing things means an “investment of values”[10]. It is at this time that the very word “realism‘ becomes derogatory.’[11]. “. Napoleon was represented by his romantic admirers, doing with human beings what Beethoven did with sounds, or Shakespeare with words […] Napoleon’s empire is conceived as the equivalent of a symphony, an epic […] This is the underlying doctrine of nationalism, fascism”[12]. Furthermore, Berlin maintains that “such an attitude is the one that has revived in modern times in the form of existentialism […] For things have no nature in this sense; their properties have no logical or spiritual relationship with objects or human action”[13]. And he concludes that “No movement in human opinion has had a similar scope and effect.” He still awaits his historians […] This, in itself, seems to me a sufficient reason to pay attention to that extraordinary, and sometimes sinister, phenomenon.”[14].

When referring to reason, it must first be specified what is meant by the term. Rationalism. There are two very different and opposing approaches in this matter. On the one hand, critical rationalism, to use an expression coined by Popper; on the other hand, constructivist rationalism, a term adopted by Hayek. In the first case, reference is made to the rational role of reason.[15] as a tool for formulating propositions in argumentation according to the rules of logic[16] in the desire to seek the greatest possible rigor in incorporating increasing doses of ontological truths. In the sea of ignorance in which we struggle, what is at stake is that through open debates between rival theories it becomes possible to incorporate fragments of fertile ground on which to stand, based on provisional corroborations that are always subject to possible refutations. The awareness of the limitations of reason and the writing of this expression with a lowercase letter certainly does not mean throwing away the fundamental instrument we have at our disposal to understand ourselves and to try to understand the world that surrounds us. Skepticism does not follow from the fallacy; on the other hand, in contradiction with its own postulates, it pretends to affirm as truth that the mind is barred from the possibility of grasping truths.

Social engineering and the planning of other people’s lives and resources come from the arrogance of constructivist rationalism or the Enlightenment, which does not consider that reason has limits and that it can encompass everything. Hayek attributes the inspiration and the beginning of this trend to “Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes and particularly to Rene Descartes […] this form of social rationalism or constructivism leads to modern socialism, planning and totalitarianism.”.[17] To illustrate the point, Hayek quotes from the second part of the The discourse of the method two thoughts: “there is rarely such perfection in works composed of many separate parts in which different hands have been employed, as in those that have been completed by a single person” and later he highlights another statement of Descartes regarding the importance derived from the design of “a wise legislator”[18]. At the same time, Ortega y Gasset, also in his criticism of this type of rationalism (which distinguishes it from what he calls “vital reason”), quotes Descartes as follows: “Everything that reason conceives says in the Fourth meditation He conceives it according to its due order and it is not possible for him to err.”.[19] It is certainly natural that Hayek finds constructivist rationalism unacceptable, especially if he claims to be the heir of Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Carl Menger[20] and Adam Ferguson, from whom he has taken the central distinction between human action and human design[21].

It is convenient, however, to clarify that the limitations of reason do not mean that in the human being—the rational animal—irrational actions can take place. Ludwig von Mises explains this point when he argues that the term “irrationality” is often used to apply to mistaken actions in terms of the use of certain means and methods with the intention of achieving specific ends. He states that “the practices of magic today are classified as irrational. They were not suitable for achieving the desired goals. However, the people who resorted to them believed that they were the correct techniques, just as, until the middle of the last century [19th century], doctors believed that the flow of blood cured various diseases.” […]. It is confusing to classify the actions of others as irrational in order to refer to people whose knowledge is less perfected regarding the person who makes the description”[22]. This confusing terminology would make us all irrational, given that knowledge will always be incomplete and imperfect. The claim that reason is being misused is different, in that it does not follow the rules of logic; for this reason, it is better to resort to the expression illogical or, in its case, that it is not being properly used to point to ontological truth in order to indicate the falsity of a proposition; or when the behaviors are considered reprehensible, but, in any case, the term irrational It does not help to clarify the problem.

   II

    Although it may not seem new, it is worth recalling what is known since the 7th century BC as the “Epimenides Trap”: namely, that since the relativist holds that everything is relative, that assertion also becomes relative and, therefore, becomes a self-destructive position. If the relativist were to affirm that everything is relative less It should be noted that to substantiate the reason for this exception, a criterion of truth must be employed; this, in turn, highlights the need to base oneself on judgments that correspond to the object being judged; that is, they are forced to start from extra-subjective or objective formulations. On the other hand, they should also explain why they do not resort to criteria of truth for everything else that would be excluded from knowledge. In turn, any claim made to explain why the criterion of truth can only be used to reveal the reasons why “everything is relative” and to exclude all else from it would be considered another criterion of truth.

To incorporate knowledge, logical rigor (formal logic) must be used so that it is understood. Validity reasoning, that is, the verification of syllogisms, which implies that the concatenation and concatenation of propositions are consistent and, at the same time, resort to the procedures of material logic so that the propositions result. True ones (the arguments are valid or invalid; only the propositions are true or false). The postmodern relativist can replace the expression “truth” or “objectivity” with “circumstantial and subjective convenience or inconvenience,” but only by appealing to the ideas of truth or falsity can the reason for the aforementioned “convenience” be explained. Malcom W. Browne recounts a meeting at New York Academy of Sciences which brought together more than two hundred social and natural science scientists from different parts of the world who, alarmed, countered the “postmodern criticism of science‘ which claims that truth depends on the perspective of each individual.[23] To take a somewhat trite example, a hungry tiger could be interpreted as a rose; but anyone who tries to approach it to smell the rose (in fact, the tiger) will hardly escape the feline’s jaws. Such an experiment will make it clear that, simply put, a tiger is a tiger and a rose is a rose. Of course, as Mariano Artigas says, “the truth of a statement does not imply a material similarity between the statement and reality; statements are composed of signs, and reality is composed of entities, properties, and processes. Truth exists when what we affirm corresponds to reality; however, that correspondence must be evaluated taking into account the meaning of the linguistic signs we use.”.[24]

Language, an essential instrument for thinking and transmitting thoughts, is the result of a spontaneous order.[25], It is not the result of any design; it is an evolutionary process. Dictionaries are books of history; they are a ex post facto. When a language like Esperanto has been designed, it has not served its purposes. The language integrates an uninterrupted process of conventions, but that does not mean that a word can be interpreted in any way; this would make communication impossible and mean the destruction of language.[26]. It is not then a matter of vapid interpretations according to the fashion of the moment. From the aforementioned convention it cannot be assumed that the definition of a word can be impunently dismantled or dissociated from its correspondence with reality without falling into nonsense.

When we refer to reality, we must be precise: we are referring to things and facts that are independent of what we may think they are.[27], including phenomena of the imagination that also sons (in the mind, as entities of reason), although they are not justified in the external world. The claims of being necessary are also part of reality, if they are to be and if the causal connections underlying reality are well described. The positive and normative aspects constitute two distinct angles of looking at reality.

Undoubtedly, everything we understand is subjective in the sense that it is the subject who understands it, but when we refer to objectivity or truth, we are referring to the things, facts, attributes, and processes that exist or take place regardless of what the subject thinks about those occurrences and phenomena that are ontologically autonomous. The aforementioned in no way contradicts pluralism and the various ends pursued by individuals, since subjective evaluations in no way contradict the objectivity of the world.[28]. It constitutes a gross non sequitur The assertion that the valuations are diverse implies the absence of objectivity in what is. These are two completely different planes of analysis: on the one hand, the subjectivity of preferences and beliefs, and on the other, the objectivity of what things are, independently of the subjective assessments and opinions held about those things.

A plan in which a distinction can be drawn between the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity is exemplified by democracy. The less general and objectively valid the issues submitted to the electoral process, the greater the conflicts of interest and the less harmony possible. There would be no conflicts of interest if the vote were limited to what is of interest to all—that is, the common good (which means the preservation of the values that are common to all: that we be respected). For this reason, it is of such great importance in this stage of the cultural evolution process to combine democracy and liberalism, since the latter means the unrestricted respect for the life projects of others. To resort to force only in a defensive, never an offensive manner. When particularisms are voted on (subjectivisms) necessarily the system opens the channels to lobby and the interests created to take advantage of themselves and to the detriment of others. Among other reasons, this happens because, as Bruno Leoni has rightly pointed out[29], In the electoral process, the legislator operates in a system of all or nothing, it is not a two-track process; it cannot legislate simultaneously on this, that, and the other things. Majorities win or first minorities lose, that is why it is of great importance to objectify the matters subject to the vote. On the other hand, votes in the market simultaneously encompass an infinite number of goods and services without resulting incompatible or mutually exclusive as in the political process. In other words, to allow civilized coexistence between people with very diverse life projects and valuations, it is necessary to limit power. When democracies extend majority decisions to sectorialisms and subjectivisms, Instead of Objectify The electoral process degrades and becomes a fight between everyone against everyone, instead of promoting harmony and peaceful, voluntary contractual relationships.

 

 

A position also opposed to realism and which is in fact related to postmodernism.[30] -exclusively at this point but on the other antipyodals- is Berkeley's solipsism: Esse est percipi, That is to say, being is what is perceived; for something to exist, it must be perceived; nothing is if it is not perceived. In this sense, Berkeley tells us that “It is strange, certainly, that the opinion prevails among men that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects have a natural or real existence distinct from that of their being perceived by the understanding […but] what are the objects mentioned above but things perceived by the sense? And what is it that we perceive that is not our own ideas or sensations? And wouldn’t it be patently repugnant if some of these, or a combination of them, existed without being perceived?”[31]. And later he argues that what we perceive must be distinguished from what we imagine, and that the first type belongs to a more elaborate order “but this is not an argument in favor of the existence of things outside the mind”[32]. But as C. B. M. Joad rightly points out, if the real is what is thought, one has to ask whether that perception is in turn real, which in turn will be the case if it is thought by another and so on in a regress. ad infinitum, Without it, nothing would exist.[33]

Popper emphasizes that the “principal philosophical and scientific task must be the search for truth”[34], ⁴² And he maintains that the “myth of the common framework” is based on “relativism (the doctrine that truth is relative to our intellectual background, which is supposed to somehow determine the framework within which we are able to think; that is, truth can vary from one framework to another), in particular, the doctrine of the impossibility of mutual understanding between different cultures, generations, or historical periods, and even in science, including physics.”⁴³, And he says that “not only do I think that it is a false statement, but also a perverse statement[…].”⁴⁴Popper argues that not only is understanding and mutual understanding possible between people from different frames of reference, but that this is particularly beneficial. In a sense, it constitutes an extension of his theory of the scientific method to intercultural relations. The more novel the reflections made by the parties, the better, since they invite them to think, to reconsider, and to refine their own presentations. In this context, he quotes a story by Herodotus about a Persian king who wanted to impress the Greeks living in his kingdom. The Greeks used to burn their dead. The king asked the Greeks what price they would require to eat their parents when they died. The recipients of the message were horrified and declined to consider a price. Then he summoned the Chaldeans, who used to eat

                                                                                                 

⁴²                             For a discussion of science and philosophy in the context of relativism, see Edmund Husserl, Philosophy as a strict science, Buenos Aires: Editorial Almagesto, [1911], 1992. Here we add that despite Edith Stein’s realistic reading of phenomenology, Ludwig Landgrebe, one of Husserl’s last assistants, attributes a postmodernist interpretation to it in “Husserl’s Departure from Cartesianism”, R. O. Elveton, ed. The Phenomenology of Husserl, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970.

⁴³                             “The ”frame myth”, The myth of the common framework. In defense of science and rationality, Barcelona: Ediciones Paidós, [1994]1997, p. 45. ⁴⁴Ibidem.p. 46.

The corpses of his parents and asked them how much they would accept to bury their parents when they died, to which they responded with the same indignation as the Greeks, since they considered the proposal an inadmissible blasphemy. Even in this extreme case - which does not concern the question of truth but of different customs - Popper considers that the result of the exchange of impressions is useful because it shakes the thinking and allows one to see the existence of other horizons.

The translations into the various languages also make it possible to demonstrate that the rules of logic are universal and not circumscribed to certain regions, despite the interference that the Marxist polylogism of the class or the racist polylogism seeks to introduce. It has never been concretely explained what the differences between the proletarian syllogisms with respect to those of the bourgeoisie or those of the Aryans with respect to the Semites consist of, nor what specifically the modifications that would be made to the logical structures of a proletarian who passes into the condition of bourgeois or vice versa, or what would happen in the mind of the children of a Semite and an Aryan. [35]. If in the process of translating from one language to another, certain vocabulary does not suffice to express an idea, neologisms will appear; just as the gradual enrichment of concepts expands any language, and if in the end it does not prove appropriate, it will be replaced by another.

Regarding the usefulness of the connection between different cultures, in another of his works[36] Popper offers us as an example the Golden Age of old Austria, which Stefan Zweig also refers to in his memoirs.[37]The famous Viennese cafés where different languages were spoken, where there were newspapers and magazines from all over the world, where no one had any awareness of their ethnicity; a time when the University of Vienna produced notable revolutions in economics, law, and – with all the questions of the case – psychoanalysis. A period in which literature and music marked an era of splendor. The interconnection of cultures generated new enriching perspectives, all of which was liquidated by Hitler and his assassins. Popperian explanations of the influence other cultures exerted on the Greeks are also interesting, along with many other examples that he left recorded.⁴⁸ and concludes that “our Western civilization is the result of the clash or confrontation of different cultures and, consequently, of the clash or confrontation of different frameworks.”[38] Popper explains how in the origins of civilizations, imaginative stories and narratives were refined through new versions through a tradition that was first oral, versions that were successively subjected to criticism, which allowed for the expansion and improvement of the original narrative; this process accelerated as the differences in perspectives among the listeners grew larger.

As stated, the analysis of relativism does not refer to personal tastes, preferences, and inclinations that are undoubtedly subjective; what it is about is recognizing the objective nature of what happens in our bodies and minds and what we experience in our daily lives. it is in the outside world[39]. It has nothing to do with relativism, the importance of pluralism, or respect for the different life projects of others. In this sense, regarding cultural relativism, Eliseo Vivas[40] It shows “the false inference that starts from the fact of cultural pluralism and arrives at the axiological doctrine that we cannot discriminate regarding the merit of each one.”[41]

Before embarking on the analysis of cultural relativism, let us pause for a moment to consider the term “discrimination.” In an open society, discrimination cannot be incorporated into the law because it would violate equality before the law.[42], This would mean that the same right is not recognized for everyone. But outside of this realm, discrimination is inevitable since every action involves differentiating, selecting, and preferring. We discriminate when we buy one book instead of another, when we choose one film production instead of another, when we talk to one person instead of others, when

We enter into marriages etc., etc. On some occasions, it has been objected that one can discriminate against someone hired for a job beyond efficiency for the same. But it is perfectly legitimate to discriminate between a relative and one who is not a relative, or between a blonde and a brunette, or between a Muslim and a Buddhist, between a skinny person and a fat one, or whatever the contracting parties consider appropriate and relevant. To reject this contradicts the power to use and dispose of one’s own property without causing harm to the rights of third parties. It is as racist to suggest segregation by force as it is to propose forced integration; each person should decide with whom they wish to establish the various types of possible relationships. The quotas imposed by law in academic centers constitute an attack on excellence, and those imposed in the same way in the labor market affect income and wages in real terms, since they translate into obstacles to capital accumulation rates.[43].

In intercultural comparisons, the complexity present in statements such as that the country's culture is different from ours must be taken into account. x It is better than the one from the country z. It is a hypothesis. Of the fact that it can be objectively affirmed that a It comes closer to the truth than b It does not conclude that it can legitimately be grouped into a uniform category for many individuals with very different ways of seeing things. It simplifies things if we refer to the standards implemented in the country. x Regarding the z, But the most rudimentary methodological individualism does not allow one to claim that the German is one way or the American is another, since this way of proceeding greatly distorts things by overlooking individual differences.

In the reference essay, Vivas highlights some contradictory considerations of relativistic anthropology. For example, “Herskovits says [in Man and his Works[that the anthropologist must refrain from making interpretations based on a preconceived frame of reference]”[44]. But if we look at this statement from two different perspectives, we observe, on the one hand, that if we adopted cultural relativism, that advice would be impossible to put into practice because the anthropologist It would be inexorably determined to interpret from one's own culture. On the other hand, now that we move away from cultural relativism, for ordinary mortals that reflection would be superfluous since it is only possible to interpret based on the “reference framework” possessed by the interpreter (which in no way means that they cannot modify it when they perceive that there are more fertile criteria, that is, that they are closer to the truth). a the truth of what is being described). In any case, the “preconceived frame of reference” available at the moment is the only way to judge when something is relevant or trivial and is the only way to formulate hypotheses, to reason, to reach conclusions, and ultimately to conduct an investigation. objective.

As Vivas observes, given that anthropologists are also widely recognized as Benedict and Malinowski (in Patterns of Culture y The Sexual Life of the Savages in NorthWestern Melanesia, (respectively) require that in the profession one “overcomes the limitations of one’s own culture—why can’t anyone else do it?”[45] What would then be the reason why understanding between people with different common frameworks is not possible based on universal criteria of truthIt does not seem then that the central axis of relativism and cultural determinism can be sustained.[46]

Determinism means a blatant rejection of free will. Physical determinism holds that human freedom is an illusion, that one's genetic inheritance and environment would constitute one's destiny. input and that what their “actions” are would be their output, that would inevitably arise from the “program” that he received. This interpretation implies that there would be no such thing as the morality of acts or individual responsibility, nor would restitution or the penalties claimed for violating the rights of others be justified. Certainly, genetic inheritance and the environment They influence about the person but not the determine (if we were culturally determined, we probably wouldn’t have gotten out of the anthropophagy).

If determinism were correct, there would be no such thing as true propositions and false propositions (as postmodernism asserts). Only truth or falsity can be referred to if man can revise his own judgments. If he has self-generated ideas. If he does not repeat like the parrot. Knowledge and the same reasoning would be meaningless. Among other things, one could not argue in favor of determinism since the interlocutor would be determined to say what he says. Branden explains to us that “A mind that is not free to ascertain the validity of its conclusions, a mind whose judgments are not free, has no way of distinguishing the logical from the illogical […] it has no right to claim to possess any kind of knowledge […] A machine does not reason: it performs the activities that its programmer established […] it cannot make any independent contribution […] no idea that expresses it can claim objectivity or truth – including the idea that man is a machine.”[47]

Indeed, it is not possible. argue in favor of determinism because, in the deterministic context, what is inevitably said is repeated. Anyone who claims to argue is, in fact, subscribing to free will, unless they claim to be simulating an argument (even if they don't know what an argument is), in which case they must admit that they do not intend to claim what they are asserting as truth since, for that to happen, they must be able to revise their own judgments and decide about which we consider true, which brings us back to free will. As we have indicated, in the deterministic world[48] It is not possible to conceive such a thing

Something like true propositions and false propositions, and therefore knowledge cannot be referred to either. In this latter sense, Adler explains that “The very meaning of the expression ‘know’ is to have the truth about the object that one is trying to know in our mind […] ‘false knowledge’ is impossible. It would not be knowledge if it were false. And ‘true knowledge’ is redundant. Knowing is incorporating the truth.”.[49]

On the other hand, if man were reduced to just a few kilograms of protoplasm, as materialism holds, there would also be no thought, deliberation, knowledge, deliberate purpose, nor self-awareness. It is the meta-physical, the psyche or mind, and not the physical, that allows argument to be made.[50] The causal links

of the absence of cause. Moreover, it is not the sense of determinism (or physical determinism, to use a Popperian expression) that we are considering in the body of this work. See C. A. Campbell, “In Defense of Free Will” in Ethics, Chicago: Free Press, 1959, Milton Munitz, comp. and J. Hospers Human behavior, Madrid: Barcelona [1961] 1979, p. 714 et seq.

 

The latter properly comprise the physical world; in the mind, however, there are reasons, explanations, or motives (sometimes called teleological causes). Quantum physics and chaos theory in no way change this assertion. In the subatomic world, there is no action and deliberate purpose; only reaction. The lack of information and the obstacles created by the very instruments of observation do not at present allow for sufficient precision, which also occurs in the context of chaos theory due to the nonlinearity that deviates from the Newtonian view. Max Planck explains that “The fact that the statistical rule does not hold in particular cases is not due to the fact that the law of causality is not obeyed, but rather to the fact that our observations are not sufficiently delicate and precise to be able to apply the law of causality directly in each case.”.⁶² Regarding the common misinterpretation of the Heisenberg principle, Gerald Holton and Stephen S. Bruch write that “The Heisenberg principle could be interpreted as a simple restriction of the principle of uncertainty.”

                                                                                                 

contradictions about determinism (in this sense, see Thomas Sowell) Marxism: Philosophy and Economics, New York: William Morrow & Co., 1985, esp.

p. 69 et seq.)—wrote that “The mode of production of material life determines the process of social, political, and spiritual life in general. It is not man’s consciousness that determines his being, but, on the contrary, it is social being that determines his consciousness.”. Contribution to the critique of political economy in Introduction to the critique of political economy, Córdoba: Past and Present [1859] 1972, pp. 35-6. And his determinism also led him to condemn the Jews (as is known, his father, he and his brothers were baptized despite coming from a family of rabbis). He condemned them in this way: “What is the secular cult practiced by the Jew? The usury. What is your secular god? The money. Well, the emancipation of the usury and the money, That is, of practical, real Judaism, would be the self-emancipation of our time. […] We therefore recognize in Judaism an element present antisocial of a general nature […] The bourgeois society constantly engenders the Jew within itself,” Karl Marx, The Jewish question, Mexico: Ediciones Quinto Sol, [1843] 1969, pp. 9 and 11.

⁶² Where is science headed?, Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, [1936] 1947, p. 150.

Our knowledge of the electron, taking into account the limitations of existing experimental methods, does not, therefore, reject the belief that the electron actually possesses a definite position and a definite amount of motion. The term ‘principle of uncertainty’ would then be appropriate, but taking into account that the principle applies to the observer’s knowledge and not to nature itself.”[51]. Werner Heisenberg himself says that “The position [of an atomic particle] can be indicated very precisely, but then the influence of the observing instrument makes the knowledge of the velocity somewhat impossible… The incomplete knowledge of a system is an essential part of any formulation of the quantum theory.”.[52]

For his part, Louis V. de Broglie summarizes the problem in this way: “Often under the influence of preconceived ideas, drawn from the positivist doctrine, they have thought that they could go further and affirm that the uncertain and incomplete nature of the knowledge that, regarding what actually happens in microphysics, is provided to us by experimentation in its current phase of development is the result of a genuine indeterminacy of the physical states and their evolution. Such an extrapolation does not seem to be justified in any way. It is possible that, by scrutinizing the future to a deeper level of physical reality, we might be able to interpret the laws of probability and the physics of the quantum as the statistical results of the development of completely determined values of variables that currently remain hidden from us. Perhaps the powerful means we have begun to use to break through the core structure and make new particles appear will one day provide us with the direct knowledge we do not possess today of this deeper level.”.[53] On the other hand, as Paul Johnson has rightly explained, it is worth emphasizing that Einstein's theory of relativity has no connection whatsoever with relativism.[54]

Postmodern relativism also extends to ethics, stating that there is no such thing as good or bad. The disappointment of not fulfilling a committed word would not be a bad thing in itself, but rather would be a situationally appropriate or inconvenient thing. There would be no such thing as actions aimed at actualizing potentials in pursuit of the good that should be valued and encouraged, nor would there be norms that, in an abstract way and for all human beings, operate towards reciprocal respect. This also applies to Ortega’s thought: “Truth, by properly reflecting what things are, is obliged to be one and unchanging.”[55]. Postmodernism, like positivism, considers ethical reflections (in the sense of universal principles) to be unsubstantiated manifestations that cannot be verified. Cohen explains that “Carnap’s claim that unverifiable propositions lack meaning is also unverifiable […] there are many cases of meaning without verification […] the domain of meaning is broader than that of verification […] The claim that ethical propositions lack meaning is part of the traditional positivist conception of the scientific method […] Ethical judgments refer to what men generally should do if they want to be prudent.”[56]

Morality refers to the normative level: it does not describe or prescribe. Hazlitt says that “It is extremely difficult to find an ethical nihilist who is consistent. When they crudely profess their nihilism, they think only on one side of the matter. They do not see because” them They should be guided by traditional moral norms. But deeper investigation reveals that in reality they expect that others They fulfill them [with them, by respecting them].”[57] Marxism is also a source from which postmodernism often draws nourishment, and not only with regard to determinism, which we mentioned above in a footnote. For example, Jean-François Revel cites Marx (from the Misery of philosophy and from his correspondence with Engels) as follows: “The good is evil in a certain sense. It is the one that must be eliminated. It is the one that opposes the progress of human relations. The ‘evil’ is the good insofar as it produces the movement that makes history by continuing the struggle.” Then Revel points out that when the International Workingmen’s Association adopted Marx’s wording in 1864, he wrote to Engels emphasizing that “I have been forced to accept in the preamble to the statutes two sentences that speak of duty and from right, as well as True, Morality y justice. I’ve placed them in a way that they won’t cause too much damage.”.[58]

III

 

 

 

Postmodern hermeneutics holds that texts and communication in general must be interpreted in the way the interpreter considers relevant, without adhering to what is stated in the text. There would be no such thing as a true or adjusted interpretation to the meaning of the text, nor such things as mistaken interpretations.[59] This is another variant of relativism. John M. Ellis says that although language arises from a convention, From this it does not follow that the words are arbitrary Because if an expression had no “place in a system of terms, there would be no system, no meaning, and therefore no language or communication” and, later, he emphasizes that the postmodernist or deconstructivist position “does not produce richer meanings as its proponents like to assume, but rather the meaning disappears. A symbol that is not recognized as something specific means nothing.” vagueness in symbols, meaning does not decrease but rather increases.”⁷². Interpretations can and indeed are various, but not all of them can be simultaneously correct regarding what the text conveys (which does not exclude the possibility, unfortunately increasingly frequent, that the message may be confusing and ambiguous, or that the text explicitly or implicitly declares that the interpretation should not be literal).

Moreover, Ellis argues that if the mental process had no relationship to the text that triggers that process and the conventions and ways of interpreting common language were discarded, communication would be impossible […S]ince the argument is made that there are no limitations [in the interpretation of texts], one is forced to abandon meaning- everything meaning, not only the specific meaning, but also the infinite and variable meaning”[60]. If the relationship between words and the things they signify is separated, the very meaning of language as a fundamental instrument for thinking and for communicating our thoughts disappears.[61] Umberto Eco summarizes the problem of postmodern hermeneutics as follows: “The reader’s initiative consists in formulating a conjecture about the meaning of the text.” intentio operis. This conjecture must be approved by the whole text as a whole organic entity. This does not mean that one and only one interpretative conjecture can be formulated about a text. In principle, an infinite number of such conjectures can be formulated. But in the end, the conjectures must be tested against the coherence of the text, and textual coherence can only reject some of the conjectures that have been ventured upon.”[62]. In another work, Eco recommends “a kind of Popperian method”: although it cannot be known which interpretation is the perfect one, at least it can be known which ones do not correspond through the corresponding refutations. Thus he alludes to “healthy” interpretations and “paranoid” interpretations. He illustrates the antithesis of Eco’s conception with a passage that he quotes from T. Todorov published in 1987: “a text is only a picnic where the author carries the words, and the readers, the meaning.”.[63]

In an essay by Don Lavoie[64] A thought by Gadamer appears here as a conclusion: “Therefore, understanding is not a process of reproduction but rather a productive one… It is sufficient to say that one understands.” in a different way when one understands it as such.”[65] In that essay, perhaps the most representative of his hermeneutic ideas in which he connects it to economics, Lavoie maintains that this approach “implies treating human actions as ‘texts’ subject to interpretation. On this level we find not only the issue of how economists understand the actions of agents in the economy, but also the issue of how agents understand each other […Furthermore, this way of seeing things] is conceived as a general theory of how we understand any matter […Furthermore, this form of seeing things] makes use of the expression ‘text’ not merely for texts in literal sense but for everything that has meaning for someone, including, for example, the words used in negotiations in the market [and] the prices reached as a result of those negotiations. […] Contracts are negotiated, engineering designs are studied, marketing strategies are developed, advertising campaigns are formulated, bids are decided on the stock exchange, the financial statements of losses and gains must be interpreted in terms of language.”[66]

Then Lavoie takes on those who argue that the hermeneutic must take the text as a process of copying, which is closest to what it is. scanner Since communication is not a zero-sum process where information is redistributed but rather a positive sum process, “a creative process,” since it is not a passive phenomenon. According to this criterion, it is a process of “giving and receiving,” a two-way phenomenon and not merely a one-way one.

But here two very different things are confused. On the one hand, the creative process that takes place in a genuine dialogue (not in a monologue). Jorge Luis Borges exhibited Macedonio Fernández as an example of a good conversationalist because “he was a man of doubt,” he ended sentences with hyphens, while Leopoldo Lugones “was an assertive man” who did not allow the idea to develop further; “he punctuated sentences, the conversation became difficult with him, because he resolved everything with a single sentence that meant a full stop […] and then you had to start over, you had to find another topic” and so on. This is a way of “annihilating thought,” as Borges’ interlocutor said at that moment.[67] Interpersonal communication is fertile not only when the participants speak in turn, but also when they allow new ideas to emerge, when there is filtering, correction, mutual learning, the plunge into the adventure of thought, exploring different avenues together, when there is awareness of one’s own ignorance and, finally, when there is a desire to learn. In this sense, to use a very central concept in game theory, communication generates a positive sum outcome, but based on the interaction between the participants. in a way that, as far as possible, results in the closest to zero sum of the messages exchanged. The positive sum would never appear if everyone interprets things differently from what the other wants to mean. The fruitful conversation has nothing to do with the arbitrary idea of interpreting the message as one pleases, because then it would not be a process of “giving and receiving” since what is given and what is received would become distorted and blurred messages due to arbitrary interpretations. It is noteworthy that Lavoie considers his interpretation of hermeneutics to be the interpretation and not merely one interpretation (apparently an exception to his thesis of subjective interpretation) because he holds that “Hermeneutics consists of a direct challenge to the theory of copying in communication. Understanding is not a reproduction of some meaning that is inherent to it, in some way as contained in the text, it is always a mediation between the text and the reader. According to hermeneutics, successful communication necessarily takes place in such a way that one agent understands what is being communicated differently from the other. Strictly speaking, precision not only is impossible but is not desirable.” [68) .(sic)

In the first meeting we had with Lavoie, we italicized the expression “literal sense” to emphasize that, contrary to what he himself claims, he apparently admits, even if only implicitly, that it is possible to find a meaning in the text itself. Now, in this last quote, it is difficult to conceive of expressing such a distortion as the one contained there, especially in the last two sentences, which, taken literally, would end any possibility of communication. But even more serious is the twisted interpretation Lavoie seeks to give to the works of Carl Menger, largely in line with Ludwig Lachmann[69] and Richard Ebeling (also inspired by Gadamer, Rorty, Paul Ricoeur and William James)[70]Lavoie says that “Being a mengeriano does not consist (mechanically) in copying something with the greatest possible fidelity from Menger’s head to ours, but (creatively) interacting with it and learning from its words […] The point of Menger’s subjectivism can be described as an obvious hermeneutic process […] It is a kind of process that Menger, if we could imagine it today with us, would call a spontaneous order […] Understanding Menger’s economy, to paraphrase Gadamer, necessarily means understanding it differently from the way Menger would have understood it when he wrote.”.[71]

The German effort to explain the subjective theory of value that revolutionized economic science would have been completely obscured if the interpretation of Lavoie had been followed, who derives from the marginalist theory an unacceptable relativism for Menger, as can be seen not only in his two best-known works.[72] but explicitly refuted relativism in the famous dispute[73] about the method (Methodology dispute) with the most prominent representative of the German Historical School (Gustav von Schmoller). Through this singular interpretation that Lavoie attempts to make, one of the most significant contributions of Menger and, therefore, of the Austrian School regarding the claim to resort to the historical case as a substitute for the method of economic science would be reversed.⁸⁷ The relativism of the Historical School denied the universality of the postulates of economic science and held that, according to nation and race, different recipes should be applied, and even within the same place, theories should be different depending on the historical moment. They rejected the possibility of abstract knowledge, in favor of casuistic procedures.

 

 

As for the spontaneous order that Lavoie refers to, Menger refers to it in a very different way. For example, when he applies the concept to the evolution of money⁸⁸, refers to processes resulting from millions of contractual arrangements that are not the result of anyone’s deliberate invention or construction and that take place due to very fragmented interests that result in an un-consciously designed order. In the market, the resulting spontaneous order constitutes a coordination process that takes place through the scattered information transmitted by prices. ⁸⁹.

                                                                                                 

Scientific Public Policy, London: Transaction Publishers, 1990, Chapter 2 and Mark Blaug and Nicholas Marchi Appraising Economic Theories Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Pub., 1991. The debate alluded to in these bibliographical references was repeated in a similar manner in the following century between John Bates Clark and the American institutionalists.

⁸⁷  For a development of the methodological perspective of Kierkegaardian philosophy, vid. Alberto Benegas Lynch (h), “Aspects of epistemology in the work of Ludwig von Mises”, Madrid: Money and Credit. Journal of Economics, No. 166, September 1983.

⁸⁸  See Vid. “The origin of money” Libertas, No. 2, May 1985 [1892], Year II.

⁸⁹  For an especially complete explanation of the meaning of spontaneous order, see Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1951] 1980.

Before proceeding with the subject of our study, given the importance of the topic, let us pause for a moment to consider the meaning of this aforementioned coordination of dispersed information. It is common for this spontaneous coordination to go unnoticed and it is often claimed that if the force apparatus were not involved, the result would be the most complete disorder: what if everyone decided to study engineering and there were no doctors? What if everyone produced bread and there was no milk? These and other questions arise due to the lack of knowledge of processes such as the “invisible hand”; without perceiving that disorder actually takes place when a planning committee concentrates ignorance rather than allowing the price system to gather the aforementioned dispersed information.[74]. And it's not that the information is too much and too complex. It's not a problem of storing information or insufficient memory in computers. This is a solvable problem; the problem lies in the fact that the information is not available. ex ante. If any of us were asked to make a guess as to what we would do in the event of bankruptcy, we could, for example, draw up a list of priorities regarding the items we would sell; but once the situation of bankruptcy arose, we would change the list because the circumstances had changed.[75][76]. We don’t know what we ourselves would do in the immediate future; we don’t know what knowledge we will have in five minutes; we can’t handle what happens in our own body because it exceeds our analytical capacity; yet we have the arrogance to pretend to handle the lives of others.   

Then, the spontaneous order bears no relation to what Lavoie interprets, making Menger say what he has not said. The unintended or unwanted consequences arising from the action have nothing to do with unleashing the imagination to interpret texts that do not say what the contextual interpreter wants them to say. It is an illegitimate extrapolation from one plane to another for which an explanation was conceived for another plane of substantially different nature.

IV

Postmodernism also touches on the field of economics, disparaging and underestimating this science. Thus, among others, Mark Blaug writes that “Perhaps the most alarming symptom of the development of empty formalism in modern economics is the growing diffusion of ‘postmodernism’ in writings on the methodology of economics. Postmodernism in economics adopts different forms but always begins with the ridicule of the scientific pretensions of economics, casting cold water on the beliefs that an objective economic system exists […] By throwing a wide net over economic methodology, it is possible to establish a clear distinction between ‘scientific realism’ and ‘postmodernism’ as two philosophical attitudes regarding methodological issues that continue to polarize economists concerned with evaluating rival theories and research programs”[77].

After commenting on relativism as the postmodern axis in its epistemological, cultural, ethical, and hermeneutic aspects, it is of interest to point out another aspect, which although it does not apply to all the authors of postmodernism, is present in much of them. This is their socialist inclinations.⁹³, When they are not openly Marxist or neo-Marxist. By the way, it is striking that they subscribe to those universal intellectual positions when they are relativists. It is not clear that they subscribe to socialism when they are simultaneously cultural determinists. Why not leave the United States alone, for example, with its supposed capitalism?^[78], If that is their culture, would it be as valid as any other? Or is it that

⁹³ Socialism in the original and most widespread sense of the word means questioning private ownership of the means of production and adopting redistributive policies based on the fruits of the work of others, which concentrates power in the hands of the monopoly of force beyond the necessary respect for the rights of each individual. However, there have been and there are those who self-identify as Socialists in the sense of referring to social relations, while at the same time they manifest great devotion to individual autonomies and, therefore, point to the limitation of the apparatus of the power of political authority to the due safeguarding and protection of justice and the rights of individuals, while maintaining discussions about the meaning and scope of these latter terms.

Are exogenous forces at work that aim to subvert the values that that culture “really” determines?

Let us take the demonstrations of an author who is often cited by many postmodernists and on whom many of their social theories are based. This is Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse claims that 

“[…] We are facing a new situation in history because today we have to free ourselves from a society that works relatively well, that is rich and powerful. I am referring strictly to the liberation of the affluent society, that is, of the advanced industrial societies. […We must insist on the integral and radical characteristics of a socialist society, in its qualitative differentiation from all constituted societies: that qualitative difference by virtue of which socialism is truly the negation of constituted systems, however productive and powerful they may seem […N] Our mistake was not being too unmodest, but being excessively modest […L] The transition from capitalism to socialism, if this is defined in its most utopian terms: namely, among others, the abolition of labor, the end of the struggle for existence – that is, life as a means to an end – the liberation of human consciousness and of sensibility as forces of transformation […] There is a new sensibility against efficient and unhealthy rationality. There is the rejection of obeying the rules of a rigid game, a game that we know is rigid from the beginning, a revolt against the compulsive cleaning of Puritan morality […] I believe that the ideas of such a universe also guided Marx’s concept of socialism.”.^[79]

It is not new to maintain that what is expressed quantitatively in the market does not translate into the qualitative. That the market unsuccessfully attempts to achieve the qualitative in quantitative terms and, therefore, the social planner is needed to avoid vulgarity, emptiness, and the acquisition of goods imposed by advertising manipulation.[80], That, in the end, socialism offers the solution to all the ills.

But the above constitutes a bad caricature of the market process in which people choose according to their preferences, given the always limited resources relative to needs. If the majority prefers poor grammar instead of high-quality literature or noise instead of sublime music or scribbling as a substitute for exquisite painting, it is not the fault of the market process. It is simply the axiological structure of the people who vote daily in the plebiscite of the market.[81]. The opposite is just as absurd as blaming the hammer for being poorly hammered or, as has been said, blaming the postman for the unpleasant content of a letter. Alluding to the market is equivalent to referring to millions of free and voluntary contractual arrangements. The market demands and the market offers; they are simplifying forms that, taken literally, constitute mere hypotheses and anthropomorphisms. Jean-François Revel explains that the common-sense argument that “the market does not fix everything” comes from the illegitimate extrapolation of socialist utopia to open society.

“[…] How socialism was conceived with the illusion of solving everyone The problems, their supporters present their opponents with the same claim. However, fortunately not everyone is megalomaniac. Liberalism has never aspired to build a perfect society […S]e judges communism by what it is. It was supposed that was going to provide and capitalism for what it actually provides […] While [the socialists] pretend to repudiate totalitarian socialism, something they do only out of convenience and with a small mouth, the left refuses to thoroughly examine the validity of socialism as such, of all socialism, for fear of being forced to discover, or rather to explicitly acknowledge, that its very essence is totalitarian.”.^[82]

Socialism does not seem to accept that the imperfections of human condition are aggravated by social planning, since by weakening or destroying the institution of private property, prices are distorted as information, which in turn leads to the difficulty and ultimately the impossibility of economic calculation.[83] Marx wrote that “communists can certainly sum up all their theory in this single expression: abolition of private property”[84]. When the property is eliminated, prices disappear because they arise from the use and disposition of the property itself, and therefore accounting and the evaluation of projects lose their meaning. Without property and without prices, it is not possible to decide between gold or pavement for the construction of roads.[85] Since resources are scarce, private property allows productive factors to be allocated to those who employ them most efficiently to meet the needs of the consuming public. The outcome matrix operates as a system of rewards and punishments for such allocation. The ignorance of property rights is one of the central reasons for the failure of socialism and the fall of the Berlin Wall (although Revel, as is well pointed out, the failure of socialism was not marked by the demolition of the wall in 1989 but by its construction in 1961).¹⁰² to prevent the citizens of a regime that truly began to disintegrate in 1917 from escaping:

a red terror that made white terror pale in comparison).

After so much penury and poverty, when not of famines and massacres imposed by socialism – although many well-intentioned socialists have never endorsed or anticipated such a final outcome due to the widening of the monopoly of force far beyond the mission of protecting rights – it does not seem prudent to claim that the mistake is “being too modest” and even less to claim the option of socialism. It is insisted that true socialism without a human face has not been implemented without perceiving that socialism necessarily implies violence: concentration and expansion of power, elimination of freedoms, annihilation of rights and, therefore, the anti-human system par excellence.

On the first day of class, students from the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Buenos Aires receive this lesson of postmodernism: “Some authors fervently believe that science is the true path to truth. The department will try to dissuade them from that idea…”.[86] It is difficult to imagine what the students go to university for. In the second class, they are told that there were two major failures in the 20th century – one, fortunately, which is the failure of Hitler; the other, which leaves endless doubts and dashed hopes, is the failure of communism.[87] Infinite doubts and dashed hopes do not seem like apt observations for a system that corrupted and denigrated everything within its reach. But that’s not all; in the ninth grade, the teacher declares: “This savage neoliberalism in which we are living…”.[88] First of all, it is necessary to point out that at the moment there is no intellectual who calls himself Neoliberal And, secondly, if we are talking about an elliptical way of referring to liberalism, it is necessary to repeat that where entrepreneurs become feudal barons based on captive markets, tariff protections, tax exemptions, and other privileges[89], Where public spending increases, state indebtedness increases.[90] and the fiscal deficit; where the absence of horizontal division of powers and the independence of the judiciary prevails, in a context of widespread corruption and impunity; where some or all of these policies take place, it is hardly possible to refer to liberalism when what is actually at stake is a socialization system.

The central concern of postmodern authors who sympathize with the socialist thought tradition is the inequality of income and wealth. However, such inequality serves a social function of transcendental importance.[91]. As we have said, in an open market, the distribution of income operates according to each person’s efficiency to meet the needs of their neighbor. Every peso allocated well means a gain; every peso allocated poorly means a loss. In turn, the resulting rates of capitalization cause real wages and incomes to rise, which allows for the inclusion of a larger number of votes in the market process.[92]. James Buchanan explains that “If there is no objective criterion for the use of resources that can be applied to the results as an indirect way of verifying the efficiency of the exchange process, then, as long as exchanges remain open and as long as force and fraud do not occur, what is agreed upon is, by definition, what can be classified as efficient.”.[93]

The only equality inherent in an open society is equality before the law. The so-called “equality of opportunity” is based on the idea that everyone should receive income commensurate with their own merits and not according to the merits of their ancestors as is the case with those born into wealthy households. But there are two objections here. First, equality of opportunity necessarily means inequality of rights because to grant the first must necessarily violate the right. Equality is before the law and not by means of She. Given the differences between individuals, these necessarily translate into different results. If equality of opportunity were granted, a system would have to be established in which not everyone enjoys the same rights. Second, as Anthony de Jasay teaches[94], The metaphor taken from sports to support equal opportunities is self-destructive because if everyone is leveled at the start of the race for life, they will have to be leveled at the finish as well, since the descendants will not be able to benefit from the resources of those who performed well, and so on, which eliminates the incentives for effort during the race.

There is another side from which inequality can be viewed, which is largely studied by Simon Green.[95] who criticize authors who elaborate on this perspective different from the traditional one, such as G. A. Cohen, Amartya Sen, Jon Elster, John E. Roemer, Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls[96]. All these authors who do not belong to the ranks of postmodernism, but who, judging by the respective bibliographical references that appear published, they nourish them abundantly with their proposals. In these cases, the focus is on the inequality of talents that nature has placed in each person, which is not due to their respective merits. Basically, those authors argue that it would be unfair for a society not to redistribute the fruits of those unequal talents, minus those that arise as a result of individual effort; that is, they limit themselves to innate talents.[97].

There are several problems with this way of analyzing inequality. First of all, the talents that result from individual effort are also connected to innate abilities or capacities to carry out the effort in question. The acting subject can decide whether to use those abilities or not, but these are distributed in different ways among the various individuals. Therefore, to continue with the line of argument of those authors, the fruit of the effort would have to be redistributed. everyone the talents.[98]

Secondly, as Green also explains, the information that the social planner intends to have regarding talents is not available. ex ante, Not even for the subject itself. Talents are revealed as various opportunities and incentives present themselves. If incentives do not exist, for example because the results of their implementation would be expropriated, those talents will not appear.[99] For his part, Hayek¹¹⁷ he points out that in a free society the possibility opens up for everyone to use their knowledge that others are not aware of; therefore, it is also not possible to know the merits of each person; that is, we cannot know how they used and with what effort they acquired those knowledge, which would lead to arbitrariness (in addition to the arbitrariness that occurs regarding the very categorization of merit).

Thirdly, there is no possibility of intersubjective comparison of talents or of establishing measures (possible amounts) between the talent of an engineer and a pianist. If the answer were that valuation and the corresponding differentiation could be carried out through what is remunerated in the market, two objections would remain. First, it would still remain unknown in what proportion their talents were used and which were the respective merits. One could have worked to the 5%th of their ability and obtained more than the other who worked to the utmost. Second, it does not seem consistent to distrust the market in order to translate the qualitative and ultimately resort to that process for evaluation.

Fourth, if the equalization of the fruits of talents were possible, that is, the leveling of incomes and wealth, the social function we have referred to regarding the allocation of resources according to respective efficiencies would be undermined, with the result that the aforementioned capitalization would not take place either, with the result of greater widespread poverty, especially for those with lesser talents and the most vulnerable in the face of life. That is why Green claims that these “methods fail and that the underlying ambition [of those authors] is inconsistent. [Ultimately,] the distinction between income equality and talent equality cannot be upheld: the latter becomes the former. Moreover, aiming for talent equality would necessarily reduce the quantity and quality of those resources available to the entire community and for the benefit of all. Radical egalitarianism [that of the aforementioned authors] turns out to be, after all, millenarian egalitarianism [traditional redistributionism] and with the same disastrous results.”.[100] For his part, regardless of what we have said, Rescher tells us that “efforts in this regard [compensating for diverse luck] are usually destined to fail. If we were to try to compensate people for their bad luck, we would simply create more room for the intervention of luck. Therefore, whatever form of compensation is adopted—money, greater privileges, special opportunities—the fact is that some people are better positioned to take advantage of them than others, so the luck we throw away through the door comes back through the window.”.[101]

Finally, also related to the previous point, Hayek[102] he points out that the purported equalization based on merit would lead to waste and would reverse the maxim of the greatest result with the least effort, and would make remuneration for the same service be paid differently (depending on what is considered to be merit subjectively). 

Before we briefly refer to one of John Rawls's works - the pioneer of this form of analysis - it is worth emphasizing that the production-distribution process is inseparable. Distribution is the opposite of production; that is why the term “re-distribution” is used to indicate that what the market has already distributed through peaceful means is redistributed through political means according to each person's efficiency in participating in the production of goods and services. To the extent that attempts are made to equalize rents and wealth, those who produce on the leveling mark will tend to refrain from producing, and those who are below that line will not strive to do so, hoping for the redistribution that will never come due to the aforementioned abstention. We cite John Stuart Mill here solely to point out that he was the one who opened the way for production and distribution to be studied as if they were two separate processes. Nor can this author be assimilated to what was later called “postmodernism”; but Mill in this chapter has also served as nourishment for the subsequent development of postmodernist (and non-postmodernist) redistributionism. He claimed that

“Whether a man wants it or not, his production will be limited by the magnitude of his previous accumulation and, starting from this, it will be proportional to his activity, his ability, and the perfection of his machinery, and to the prudent use of the advantages of the combination of labor […] The same does not happen with the distribution of wealth. This depends solely on human institutions. Once things exist, humanity, individually or collectively, can dispose of them as it pleases. It can make them available to whoever pleases it and under the conditions it deems appropriate.^[103]

Regarding Rawls, it is worth noting that, regardless of the very fertile figure he resorts to of the “veil of ignorance” as a conceptual tool for studying different proposals in which the participants do not know in what position they will be placed when applying certain general principles, the author emphasizes the importance of what he calls the “principle of difference” and the “principle of compensation.” The first refers to the different natural distribution of talents and, the second, would translate into a policy aimed at redistributing the results of that unequal distribution of talents. Rawls says that “Natural distribution is neither just nor unjust, nor is it unjust that people are born in a certain social position. These are merely natural facts. What can be just or unjust is the way in which institutions act in relation to these facts […] The basic structure of these societies incorporates the arbitrariness of nature.” However, men do not need to submit to these contingencies. The social system is not an immutable order placed beyond the control of men, but a pattern of human action.”.[104] Ultimately, Rawls does not accept the process of positive externalities that result in increases in wages and income in real terms as a consequence of increases in the rates of capitalisation, since if this were the case he would not find the principle of compensation necessary.[105] That is why ownership of the means of production and contractual freedom are not included in the list of Rawlsian basic freedoms. This is what it says: “Of course, the freedoms that were not included in the list, for example, the right to own certain types of property (for example, the means of production) and contractual freedom, as understood by the doctrine of the laissez-faire, They are not basic, and therefore they are not protected by the priority of the first principle.”.[106] The first principle of Rawls' justice is that one's freedoms are equal to the freedoms of others.[107]

His concern for egalitarianism led him to say to Tocqueville that “Despotism seems particularly frightening in democratic ages.”.[108] And in the last lines of one of Herbert Spencer's works we read that: “The function of liberalism in the past was to limit the powers of kings. The function of liberalism in the future will be to limit the powers of parliaments.”.[109] The magnitude of the differences in income and wealth is irrelevant, as Buchanan has said in the definition of efficiency that we have outlined; in this case, inequalities in the market (not based on privileges or fraud) are necessarily optimal, which allows everyone to improve. Socialisms, even those that claim to be “humanist”, mean the expansion of the power of the monopoly of force with the inexorable moral and material consequences that history has repeatedly demonstrated, no matter how good the intentions of many of its promoters may have been. Even in the name of egalitarianism, the worst and greatest of inequalities is imposed: that of the people versus the people. nomenclature which concentrates the sum of political power. It should be emphasized once again the authoritarian or, in its case, totalitarian character that lies at the very roots of the socialism admired by so many postmodernists.[110]

V

   This work is basically directed at those who are not convinced of the merits of postmodernism, since, in the cases of those who subscribe to these conceptions, it seems difficult for me to engage in a dialogue. reasonable. For this reason I was tempted to test a refutation of the Popperian thesis of the myth of the common framework, until I realized that postmodernism is ultimately not a framework at all but represents the antithesis of framework par excellence, since it ignores the rules of logic and is therefore similar to a conversation with someone who would limit themselves to uttering inarticulate guttural sounds. It is not that one does not understand what they mean; it is that if the opponents of postmodernism are reduced to being logocentrists and if truth and reason and therefore argumentation are relativized, it does not seem that there would be any possible agreement. Moreover, however optimistic one may be, it appears that this is a lost cause. Not in terms of refuting the thesis, but rather the apparent impossibility of maintaining a dialogue with postmodernism, which, on the other hand, considers

“intolerant” towards those who do not adhere to the various manifestations of relativism. Sebreli is very right when he states that “What is presented today as post It's just a pre”[111] Since, in truth, postmodernism involves a situation that predates even classical Greece; in this sense they are pre-modern.

On the other hand, it is interesting to emphasize the fact that the debate on social and economic issues usually is easier to conduct with postmodernists because, generally, on this level of discussion, they are devoid of the philosophical issues present in the analysis that revolves around relativism. 

If one navigates the Internet in search of postmodern literature, one will find that most of the titles are of a rather academic nature. Beyond Truth, Beyond Goodness, Beyond Reason, Beyond Virtue, Beyond Epistemology, Beyond Beauty or else The End of Philosophy, The End of Culture, The End of Religion, The End of Art, The End of Family, The End of Capitalism and even The End of Man, All of which is not particularly stimulating.

Bruce Caldwell invites us to engage in a debate by taking into account the assumptions and the rationale behind the opponent’s arguments and to test from that side the eventual inconsistency of the reasoning or the falsity of the propositions.[112] In this case, we have directed our efforts in that direction. We trust that the goals have been achieved, if not in part at least, but we must bear in mind that for postmodernists it lacks meaning to allude to “inconsistency” (which refers to formal logic) or to “falsity” (which refers to material logic).

Two physics professors belonging to a left-wing intellectual tradition – Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont – published a book of extraordinary impact in the intellectual world.¹³¹. The first of the authors mentioned, after passing the approval of the referees of the case, published in 1996, in Social Text, a long essay loaded with the corresponding craftsmanship of footnotes and abundant bibliographical references, titled “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Formative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity”. After publication, Sokal declared that with that essay he was actually mocking the imposters in the intellectual world who, with a silken tongue and riddled with inconsistencies and errors, roam academic centers boasting a false erudition and wisdom worthy of better cause. He tried to publish it in the same issue. journal His own refutation, but they denied him the privilege claiming that the new essay lacked academic merit and therefore published it elsewhere. The reference book expands on the topic discussed in the essay, which is published alongside the own refutation in two appendices. The work is precisely aimed at criticizing postmodern relativism with weighty arguments and directed at a wide range of authors (ultimately, cognitive relativism also weakens Marxism because it does not allow for its universal application, even after the well-known disappearance of classes).[113]).

Regarding the use of the sibiline language, I would like to conclude this work with another thought of Popper: “Now, the search for truth is only possible if we speak simply and clearly, avoiding unnecessary complications and technicalities. For me, seeking simplicity and clarity is a moral duty of all intellectuals: the lack of clarity is a sin and the presumption a crime.”.[114]